

(Cicero [Laelius])

K

TULLY's Lælius :
O R, 8411. 6. 46
DISCOURSE
UPON
Friendship.

Translated from the Latin.

*Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divina-
rum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia &
caritate summa consentio: Qua quidem haud
scio, an, excepta sapientia, quicquam melius,
homini sit à diis immortalibus datum.*

*Quid enim dulcius, quam habere, qui cum omni
audeas sic loqui, ut tecum?*

*Caritate, benevolentiaque sublata, omnis est è vita
sublata jucunditas. Cic. de Amicit.*

L O N D O N :

Printed by W. S. for RICHARD WILKIN,
at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard.
MDCGXIII.

LEAHUT



*The Hon.^{ble} S. Tho. Robinson of Rookby Park
in the County of York Bar. one of y^e Commis-
sioners of his Majesty's Revenue of Excise & T. R. S. &c.*



TO

The HONOURABLE

William Cadogan, Esq;

S I R,

IN the offering of this
little Treatise to *You*,
it is my Happiness to
appear not in the Form
of Common *Dedications*,

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which generally is to dress up some gaudy Nothing ; and make a *Panegyrick* to some splendid *Idiot*. For, had it not been my particular good *Fortune* to have had an Opportunity of Addressing to *You*, I should have wanted a *Name*, to have sheltered my self under, or that I could have made use of, without incurring and running into the common Guilt of *Flattery* and *Adulation*. And of this I am pretty well assured, whatever the World shall say of the Translation it self, yet my Judgment in the Choice of my *Patron*,
they

they will Applaud, and acquit me of Temerity and Indiscretion, in fixing it upon *You*. For who will not readily own and acknowledge that Person to be the most proper and agreeable to recommend *Friendship*, and be its *Protector*, who has acted a generous Part therein; who with Glory and Reputation, has adorn'd himself with the distinguishing *Character* of a *Sincere Friend*. Nor, I believe, will any one deny, or be unwilling to confess that *You*, Sir, are the brightest Resemblance of that *Friendship* described and

painted out in the *Lælius* of *Cicero* ; and that the best *Manners* and *Characters* therein, may be peculiarly called *Your* own. This, *Sir*, is even what *Your Enemies* (had *You* any Personal ones) will readily grant, though perhaps they will not altogether be so forward to Copy out.

But the *World* wants not to be inform'd of *Your* Personal *Worth* and *Merit*, or that *You* have a *Soul* fill'd with the first *Sentiments* of *Honour*, *Generosity*, and undisguised *Sincerity* ; the very *Virtues* and *Qualities* that are necessary to the
Being

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Being and Existence of perfect *Friendship*. For the *Character* You have maintain'd in *Your* Conversation both at *Home* and *Abroad*, has given the World the firmest Assurance, that *You* have all that greatness of Soul, probity of Manners, singular Faithfulness and Integrity, which *Friendship* is established, carried on, and supported by. How clear do *Your Actions* stand from Mercenary Views, from Mean and Selfish Designs? And the Service of *Your Self*, was always the last End, and least thought of: For, with what *Fideli-*

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ty, Bravery and Honour,
did *You* serve your *Queen*
and *Country*, when they
had occasion for *You*, and
call'd for Your Assistance?
And how grateful have *You*
been to Your *Friend*, in re-
tiring with him when Pub-
lick Business was at an end;
and the *Sword* was thought
no longer necessary to re-
main drawn for the Defence
of *Liberty* and Your *Coun-*
try? Who but *Your Self*,
could have withstood the
powerful and prevailing
Temptations of *Dignity* and
Profit, for the Sake of Your
Friend? Or who but *Your*
Self, would have relinqui-
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shed them, because *You* could not enjoy the other. Very justly does the Application of this Celebrated *Passage* of *Lælius* become *You* ; and what have Your *Actions* done but spoke the very same *Words* ?

Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut Fortuna, aut Natura tribuit, nihil habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim Comparare.

This Generous Behaviour, Sir, will perpetuate Your Great *Name* to Posterity, make You shine bright in *After-Ages*, and appear well in distant *Futurity* : When, perhaps, it
may

may not be thought a *Crime* to have been *Marlborough's* Friend.

Honour, Glory, and an unfullied Reputation, will be Your Reward, while Actions of Valour, and true Courage may be said to Merit any Thing; and You will continue to be the Delight of Mankind, while Gratitude and Friendship, shall be worth Notice, and fit for Practice.

Scipio was happy in the *Familiarity and Friendship* he enjoyed by the *Acquaintance and Correspondence of Lælius, a Gentleman of Probity, Sincerity,*
and

and endued with all those excellent and distinguishing Qualities, that could make him worthy of that Great Name. No less happy, may I presume to say, does the *Hero* of *Great-Britain* think himself in Your Frindship and Familiarity ; for how can he not be so, when to You he can freely disclose *Himself*, without Caution or Reserve ; when You he can admit to have a Passage into his Soul, and yet is as safe and secure, as if no Body was Conscious of his Thoughts, and his Secrets lay still confin'd and smother'd in his own Breast? For in trusting his *Friend*, he still
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confides in Himself; because, every *True* and *Sincere Friend*, like *You*, is a Man's very Self.

It is now no longer that we need look so far back in search of *Perfect Friendship*: It is now no longer that we need go to *Ancient Rome*, to find the best *Examples of Gratitude* and *Mutual Love*. For *Scipio* and *Laelius* are lost in the Greater Names of *Marlborough* and *Cadogan*; who will ever be a standing Rule to Imitate and Practise by. And *Britain* now, can make her Boast of a *Pair of Friends* equal, if not superior to whatever liv'd before them; and as much worthy of that

that *Name*, as any that ever
deserved it. Friends that are
not only happy in *Themselves*,
but have dealt the kind Influ-
ences of it wherever they were
Concern'd.

It was that firm Friendship,
that carried the conquering
Arms of *Britain* so far, as to
make the mighty *Monarch* sue
for Peace, to save the remain-
ing Part of his tott'ring *King-
dom*. (For, it was this that united
You in all *Your* Counsels, so be-
neficial to the Preservation of
Europe; and which made the
Arms of *Great-Britain* a Ter-
ror to haughty *France*.)

And whatever shall be the
happy Consequences of the
finish'd

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finish'd *Peace*, are in some measure owing to that *Friendship* which united *You* into a generous Concern for *Your Country*.

And now the *Toils of War* are over, the same *Friendship* that made *You* Inseparable there, will make *You* happy in the sweet *Enjoyment* of each others *Society*, to the Pleasure and Satisfaction of *Your Selves*; retired from *Hurry* and *Importunacy*.

Sir, I will detain *You* no longer, lest by being tedious, *You* should deny Pardon for my *Presumption*; and therefore only beg Leave to assure *You*, that *You* may long live an *Heroick,*

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roick, Generous, and bright Ex-
ample of *sincere Friendship*, in
an Age that produces little but
pretended and *out-side Friends* ;
is the Prayer and Wish of,

S I R,

Your most humble,

And most obedient Servant,

Robert Hicks.

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Friendship

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Friendship.

I. **Q**uintus Mucius the *Augur*, took many Occasions of Launching out with a great Readiness of Wit, mixt with a Strain of Mirth, into the Praise of C. *Lælius*, his Father-in-law ; and never scrupl'd to confer upon him the Character of the *Wise Lælius*. Now as soon as I came to the Years of Discretion, I was by my Father committed to the Inspection of *Scævola*, and enjoyn'd to embrace all Opportunities which might suit with his, or my own Convenience, of being in the Presence of the good old Man. As I had therefore several Opportunities of laying up in my Memory many Points of Learning, of which I had heard him debate with a great Nicety of Judgment ; together with many short and *apposite* Sayings ; I en-

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2 Tully of *Friendship*.

deavoured to improve my self by the Conversation of so prudent and learned a Gentleman. Upon his Death, I committed my self to the Care of *Scævola* the *Pontifex*; whom I dare aver to be as Learned and Just a Man as any in the Whole State. But, to make no Digressions upon the Character of that Gentleman, at present I shall confine my Discourse to the *Augur*. I particularly remember as he once sat in his great Elbow-Chair, (I, and two or three more of his Friends being present) amongst other Topicks, he fell into a Discourse that then happen'd to be the universal Subject of Conversation. You, *Atticus*, as being then intimately acquainted with *Publius Sulpicius*, must needs remember how extremely the World was surprized at, and complained of the irreconcilable Hatred that he (when *Tribune* of the People) profess'd against *Quintus Pompey* the Consul, with whom he formerly lived in the strictest Bonds of Love and Friendship. I say, *Scævola*, having at that time accidentally fallen into that Subject, from thence took an occasion of relating to us *Lælius's* Discourse of Friendship, which he held in the Presence of *Scævola* himself, and of *C. Fannius*, *Marcus's* Son (who was another of his Sons-in-law) a little after the

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the Death of *Africanus*; the Sum of that Dissertation I committed to my Memory, and have here set it down according to my own Fancy: For I have here introduc'd them speaking in *propria Persona*, that I might not tire you with the frequent Repetitions of *so*, and *says he*; and that the Discourse might seem directly to proceed from the Mouth of the Authors. A Discourse upon *Friendship*, is what you have very often begg'd of me: And indeed, as it is a Subject that very well deserves the Notice and Consideration of Mankind in general; so it particularly seems very apposite to the Familiarity and Intimacy that is between us. Wherefore I am the more willingly induc'd to the Undertaking, because I am perswaded I shall do some good to the Publick, at the same time I oblige my Friend. As in my little Treatise of *Old Age*, which is dedicated to your self, I have introduc'd Old *CATO* arguing in its Defence; because I thought no Man a more proper Advocate for Old Age, than one who was so far advanc'd in it, and was so *Eminent*, and so *peculiarly a Glory to it*: So for the very same reason, being inform'd from the Tradition of our Ancestors, how strict, and intimate a Familiarity there was between *Caius Lælius* and *Publius Scipio*, I have pitch'd upon

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Laelius as the most proper Person to give you his own Reflections and Thoughts upon Friendship, as *Scævola* remembers to have heard them from his own Mouth.

This sort of Writing by way of Dialogue, when supported by the Reputation and Authority of ancient Men, and them too, of the first Character, hath something so taking in it, and leaves so very deep an Impression, that in the perusal of my own Lines about Old Age, I can hardly persuade my self, but that the Thoughts and Expressions are *Cato's*, and not my own. As then therefore the Consideration of your being your self in Years, induc'd me to lay that Treatise of *Old Age* at your Feet; so, upon a Motive no less applicable, I have presumed to prefix your Name to this Treatise of *Friendship*, and to beg your Protection for the Production of a Man, to whom you are dear by the most sacred Ties of Amity. In the former Treatise you have the Thoughts and Reflections of *Cato*, a Gentleman of as much Learning, and as far advanc'd in Years as any of those Times. In this latter you are entertained with a Discourse of the *Wise Laelius*, that Glorious and Heroick Pattern of pure and inviolable Friendship. Let me beg you therefore to turn your Thoughts a while from me, and imagine

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it is *Laelius* himself that entertains you. *Caius Fannius* and *Quintus Mucius* come to pay their Father a Visit, to comfort him upon the Death of *Africanus*. They begin a Discourse upon Friendship which you will find in the reading, is the Contents of the whole Treatise; upon which Head *Laelius*, at their Request, proceeds.

II. *Fannius*. We must all, Sir, acknowledge *Africanus* to have been a very eminent and deserving Person; but at the same time you ought not, out of too great a sense of Modesty, to neglect your own Merit; but to imagine the Eyes of the whole World at present fix'd upon your self. 'Tis you alone, Sir, we universally distinguish by the Name of the *Wise Laelius*; and you alone whom we really esteem so,

Marcus Cato, it is true, was remarkable for the same Character; and *Lucius Attilius* too, we are satisfied to have had the same Distinction paid him by our Ancestors; but yet both were adorn'd with a Character very different from yours. *Attilius* was eminently remarkable for his great Judgment in the Civil Law: *Cato* bore the Character of a great Politician, and was lookt upon as a Man thoroughly vers'd in the Affairs of the World. From

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his prudent Foresight and Management, both in the Senate and *Forum*; from his steady Resolution in Acting, and from his weighty and pithy Arguments, proceeded that great Deference that was paid him by all Mankind; tho' not before he was far advanced in Years neither. But your Character is of a higher strain: 'Tis not only your natural Genius, and Probity of Manners, but your indefatigable Study, and eminent Learning that hath made you so conspicuous (not only among the common People, but Men of Letters too) for a Wisdom no way inferiour to that of the *Græcian* Sages. Tho' as for those Seven who bore that Character, they are reckoned by the Criticks not to deserve the Distinction. The *Athenian* indeed was universally esteemed so, and had the Attestation of the Oracle for a Confirmation of his Character. But to us, your placing your Happiness within your self, and making *Fortune submit to the superiour Force of Virtue*, appears a no less manifest Proof of your exalted Wisdom. Wherefore the World enquires both of my self and *Scævola*, how you deport your self upon the Death of *Africanus*; and particularly the more, because upon the *Nones* of this last Month, you were not present at the Lecture held at *D. Brutus's Garden*,
tho'

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tho' before you was the most exact Man of the whole Society, in regard to time, and the most ready at the Performance of that Duty.

Scævola. I have often (as *Fannius* says) been asked the same Question ; and always answered, that you seem'd to bear the Loss of so eminent a Man, and so dear a Friend, with abundance of Calmness and Moderation : Tho' indeed it would be impossible for a Gentleman of your *Human and Generous Disposition*, not to be sensibly affected at it. But as to your being absent last Lecture, I excused it, by attributing it to an Indisposition of Body, rather than of Mind. *Lælius.* Indeed, *Scævola*, you were in the right : For whilst in Health, I will never so far give way to my own Misfortunes, as to suffer them to withdraw me from the Performance of those Functions which Duty lays incumbent on me. Neither indeed, do I think any Excuse to a Man of a steady Soul, a sufficient Plea for the Neglect of his Duty. As for you, *Fannius*, by honouring me with a Character that I neither deserve, nor aim at, you act indeed the Part of a good Friend ; but in my Opinion, you do not pay *Cato* the Deference that is due to him : For I must own, I take *Cato* to have been a truly Wise Man, if (which

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I very much question) there ever was one. To omit other Instances, what greater Proofs of Wisdom could he give, than that calm Temper and Resignation with which he bore the Loss of his Son? The Department of *Paulus* and *Gallus* upon the like occasion, is within my Remembrance; but their Children were but Infants, their Hopes were nipt in the very Bud, before they could display their Beauties and Perfections: And their Misfortune therefore was not comparable to *Cato's*, who bemoan'd the Death of a very hopeful and promising young Gentleman. Wherefore in my opinion, Gentlemen, you have very little Reason to give even *Socrates* himself the Preheminence: For *Cato's* Character is owing to his Practice; whereas the Latter's is founded only on Theory and Speculation.

III. As for my own particular, should I deny my Concern for the Death of *Scipio*, the Stoicks possibly might commend me: But really, my own Conscience will not suffer me: And I must own my self very sensibly afflicted for the Loss of such a Friend, as no Man ever was, and, I dare affirm, ever will be blest'd with: But I am not without a Remedy.
This

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This, amidst all my Afflictions, is still my Comfort, that I have not imbibed that Error so prevalent amongst Friends, which wracks them with such cruel Torments at their Departure. For in my opinion, *Scipio's* Fate is not deplorable ; and it is I alone, if any body, deserves your Compassion : But Grief, when conceived for our own Misfortunes, seems to proceed from a Principle of Self-Love, rather than a Principle of Friendship. Who can deny, but that *Scipio* was well dealt with : For unless Immortality, which he never aspired to, had been added to the Honours that had been conferred upon him, what was there that a Mortal Man dare hope for, which he did not obtain ? Those early Hopes which in his Childhood the World conceiv'd of him, fell infinitely short of that Merit, and those Qualifications which adorn'd his riper Years. Twice he was invested with the Consular Dignity, altho' he never su'd for it ; the first time, before the customary Age ; the second, within his due time, but almost too late to save the sinking State. By overthrowing two Cities that were profess'd Enemies and Rivals to *Imperial Rome*, he not only put an end to the present War, but put it out of their power to raise new Commotions for

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for the future. His affable and gentle Disposition, his dutiful Deportment to his Mother, his Generosity to his Sisters, his charitable and courteous Behaviour to his Friends, the Justice that appear'd in all his Actions, are Virtues that shone forth in so bright a Lustre, that it is needless for me to insist on them: And how serviceable and dear he was to the State, those Showers of Tears that were shed at his Funeral, are a sufficient Witness. The Addition therefore of a few Years would have been but of little service to him: For supposing Old Age to sit easie upon us, as I remember *Cato* asserted the Year before he died, in the Presence of my self and *Scipio* yet it damps our Spirits, and causes that; Vigour and Sprightliness with which *Scipio* was endued, to decrease and flag. He had already therefore arriv'd to the highest Pitch both of *Fortune and Honour*; and had he liv'd to the Age of *Nestor*, it would have been impossible for to have made any Addition to them. And as for his Death, the Suddenness of it made him insensible of those bitter Pangs, and dreadful Apprehensions that generally attend us at our last Gasp. Such a sort of Death, in my mind, seems something unaccountable, and you your self are not ignorant of the Construction

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tion the World puts upon it. But this, I dare affirm, that among all those glorious and happy Days which he saw, he never seem'd so eminently conspicuous, nor shined forth with so great a Lustre, as he did the Evening before he died, when upon the Adjournment of the Senate, he was attended to his House by the *Patricians* themselves, as well as by the *Latins* and *Allies*: For the Honour and Respect that was then paid him, seem'd rather to intimate his Accession to the Heavenly Throne, than his Confinement to the *Shades* below. For I own my self of a different Opinion from some Men, who have lately asserted the Soul not to survive, but after Death to be utterly annihilated with the Body.

IV. In my Opinion, there is more Deference to be paid to the Authority and Opinion of the ancient Sages, not only of our own Country, but even of those too, to whom *Greece* (that now indeed is ruin'd, tho' formerly so powerful and flourishing a Nation) owed all its Laws and Institutions; than to doubt the Immortality of the Soul. For certainly they would never have paid so many Rites and Ceremonies to the Dead, did they not think it a Debt that

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that was justly due to them. *Socrates* too (who, unless we deny the Testimony of the Oracle, we must all own to have been a Man of a very exalted Wisdom) not only now and then, as the generality of Mankind asserted their Opinions, but at all Times, and in all Places, averr'd the Soul of Man to be of a *Divine Nature*, and that when it is once freed from the Prison of this Mortal Carcase, the Road to Heaven lies open to every just and good Man: And *Scipio* likewise seem'd to run into the same Opinion. If then the Souls of good Men, when once loosed from this Clog of Vile Clay, flies to the *Blessed Mansions of the Gods above*, who can claim a juster Title to a Seat among them, than *Scipio*. To grieve therefore at this Accident, in my Opinion, tastes more of Envy and Ill nature, than real Friendship. On the other hand, could we suppose the Thinking Faculty to be annihilated with our Bodies, and our Soul not to survive the Grave; yet even then, as we should reap no Benefit by dying, so we shall have no Apprehension of Evil from it. The Difference only will be this, that he, to whom the City owes so many, and so great Blessings, and whose Birth we ought to solemnize with the greatest Marks of Joy and

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and Gratitude (should the thinking Faculty perish with the Body) will himself be no more, but become like the Child that is unborn. For *Scipio* therefore we have no reason to complain: I alone am the Loser; who, as I first made my Appearance upon the Stage of Life, ought first to have made my *Exit*. However, the Dear Remembrance of our Friendship brings this Comfort along with it, that my Life was ever happy, because ever bless'd with the Company of *Scipio*: Who ever bore a share of all my private Uneasinesses, and publick Troubles, and was my constant Companion at home and abroad: And, what is the very Quintessence of Friendship, between us there was a perfect Harmony in all our Studies, Thoughts, and Actions. For my own part therefore, I am infinitely better pleased with the Hopes of having the Memory of our Friendship perpetuated to Posterity, than with all those Marks and Distinctions which *Fannius* says, the World confers upon me tho' Undeservedly; and I am better satisfied, because there never yet have been above three or four Pair of Friends remarkable for their Truth and Sincerity; in which Roll, I hope, Posterity will find the Names of *Scipio* and *Laelius* inserted. *Fannius*. That, Sir, there is

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is no doubt of: but since you have mentioned *Friendship*, you will infinitely oblige me, and, I believe, *Scævola* too, if, as you are used to do upon other Topicks, you please to divert a leisure Hour or two in entertaining us with your Thoughts of *Friendship*, wherein you think it consists, what Methods you Judge most necessary for the Attaining, and what Cement is the most proper for the Preservation of it? *Scævola*. Upon my Word, Sir, I shall take it as a very particular Favour, and indeed had not *Fannius* prevented me, I was going to beg the same Request of you, which we now Joyntly desire you to oblige us in.

V. *Laelius*. Was my power, Gentlemen, equal to my Will, I should very Readily comply with your Request; for it is a Subject very well worth our Consideration, and as *Fannius* says, we have a leisure Hour or two to spare; but really, Gentlemen, my Abilities are not capable of so great a Task; it is from such learned Heads as the *antient Grecians*, that we must expect extempore Discourses. This is an Undertaking of great Difficulty, and requires no little Practice: Wherefore I must refer you to have your Desires fulfilled by those Gentlemen who make such Things their

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their Business; for all that I can pretend to, is only to advise you, above all earthly Blessings, to give the preference to *Friendship*, which, in my mind, is the only Good that can make Affluence and Prosperity agreeable, or render a turn of Fate tolerably easy to us. But then I take it for granted, that only good Men can enjoy this Blessing, and that Virtue is the proper Cement of it; tho' I shall not search so far to the bottom of it as those Men do, whose *Divisions* on this Subject are more *curious*, their *Distinctions* *nicer*, and perhaps truer too, tho' not so well adapted to common Use; for they assert the wise Man to be the only good Man; which we would allow, would they not wind that Wisdom up to a higher pitch, than is possible for mortal Man to attain to: Whereas we ought to have regard, not to the *vain Chimæra's*, which extravagant People either feign or wish for; but to those Things which are serviceable in common Way of Life; *C. Fabritius*, *M. Curio*, *T. Coruncanius*, were Persons whom our Ancestors adorn'd with the Character of the *wise*; but had they been examin'd by the Rule of those *nicer Gentlemen*, they would never have been thought worthy of that Distinction. Let them therefore keep to themselves that odious Title which they so
much

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much brag of, though so little understand; provided they will allow the forementioned *Gentlemen* a place among the Class of good Men. But even that they refuse, affirming it an Honour which the *Wise* alone have claim to. We therefore must be contented to affirm in the gross, that those Men whose Lives and Morals are a Proof of their *Faith, Integrity, Impartiality* and *Liberality*; whose Virtue are not corrupted with the Seeds of *Covetousness, Lust, or Rashness*; and who are as equally eminent for their Steadiness and Resolution, as those Men whom we have just nam'd; these *Gentlemen*, I say, since they follow, (*as much as frail Flesh and Blood can*) and are subservient to the Dictates of wise Nature, that true and only Guide to Happiness, as they are reckon'd among the Rank of good Men, so ought they to have the Deference paid them that is due to so bright a Character. For I really am persuaded that we are all born to Converse, and have Society one with another; and the nearer we are allied to each other, the stricter ought the Community to be: Hence it is that *Fellow Citizens* ought to be preferr'd to *Foreigners, Neighbours* and *Relations* to *Strangers*; with these Nature herself directs us to contract a Friendship, tho' the Cements of it are not the most

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most lasting. In one Point therefore, Friendship is to be preferr'd to Affinity and Kindred; for Love and Benevolence often flag, and wax cold among Relations; when on the other Hand they are the only Cement that unites Friends, and the loss of them too great for Friendship to survive without them. But the excellence of *Friendship* appears in nothing more, than that it is separated from the general Society, which Nature hath established and confined within the narrow Compass of two or three Breasts, united to one another by a mutual Love and Benevolence.

VI. The Notion that I have of Friendship, is this, that it is a perfect Union, and Agreement in Thought, and Disposition, in Things relating either to this World, or what's beyond it, joyn'd with the Cement of Mutual Benevolence and Good *Nature*. Both the Happiness and Advantage of Friendship are so great, that (Wisdom excepted) I should call it the first *Privilege* and *Blessing*; the Gods have granted to Humane *Nature*. The tendency of other Mens Fancies and Judgments perhaps, may prompt them on to fix their Esteem and Deference, either upon Riches, or a good share of Health; others may give Grandeur

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and

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and Power the *Prevalence* ; others fasten their Minds upon Title and Equipage ; and the generality of Mankind upon Pleasure, the Idol of Sense. As for Pleasure, the Desire of many, that's the Advantage and Happiness of Beings below Reason ; and the very Nature of all the rest is unconstant and feeble, the slippery Gifts of Fortune, and beyond our power to keep. There are others (and those but a very few) who make Virtue the *Summum Bonum*, and deservedly merit for their good Choice : But then it is confessedly true, that Virtue is the Product and Preserver of Friendship, both gives life to it, and preserves its Existence. For Friendship neither appears nor continues, where Virtue is wanting ; that Virtue I mean, which appears in practice of Life, and which does not consist in the airy Idea which *School-men* and *Philosophers* entertain of it. The *Pauli*, the *Cato's*, the *Caii* and *Scipio's*, and the *Phili*, we allow to be the Good and Great, in concert with the Judgment and Opinion of the World ; yet not without their Shares of Frailty and Miscarriage. As for the Perfect and Infallible, we neither know them, nor have any thing to say to them. Among such Men as I have just mention'd, the Conveniencies and Good of Friendship, are not to be described by the Invention of Words.

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Words. For, in the first Place, as *Ennius* has admirably said, who in Humane Nature cannot say he is happy in the possession of a sincere Friend? For what can be a greater pleasure, than for a Man without Mistrust or Reserve, to let his Friend have a Passage into his Soul, and he is as safe and secure, as if no Body was conscious to his Thoughts? Where would be the relish and taste in Affluence and a good Estate, if we wanted a Friend to rejoyce and partake with us? And what an insupportable Load wou'd Want and Affliction be, but for the Blessing of Friendship? that Softener of Cares, a Comfort and Ease to all the Miseries that we are subject to: How heavy should we drag on without it, and how is the Burthen alleviated by it? But, in fine, there is nothing which either we pursue or aim at, but has its proper and particular Use and Advantage; now, Riches are proper for Actions of Generosity and Benevolence; Grandeur and Power, procure Obeisance and Attendance; Titles, Honour and Respect among People; Pleasures are for the Gratification of Sense and Appetite; Health, to live at ease, and free from the disturbance of Pain, and withal to be in a capacity to perform the necessary Functions of Life, and to discharge the Business of this World. But the use and

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good of Friendship is not confined, or tied down to this or that particular Advantage; it answers every State and Condition of Life, and there is no one virtuous Scene of Action, but wherein it is proper; and we are at a loss to fix the Time, when it is unseasonable, or unpleasant. In a word, Friendship is as necessary, and as many ways serviceable to our Being, as the *Air* to breathe in, or those Elements of *Fire* and *Water*, which we cannot be supported without. Mistake me not, I am not describing that outward and shallow part of Friendship which perhaps may please, and have its Advantages too; but I am discoursing and speaking of the Nature and Constitution of perfect and ingenuous Friendship, which is practised and entertained but by an inconsiderable part of the World. For Prosperity, from the influence of Friendship, shines brighter; and even the Calamities of Life become tolerable by the benefit and assistance of it.

VII. And since there arise, from the benefit of Friendship, Conveniencies that are not only numerous, but in their Natures very valuable also; I take this not to be the least which gives Hopes to our Expectations, and is an Antidote to Despair, and weakness of Mind. But besides,

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sides, Friendship is like a Looking glass, which every time we view it, gives us a Representation of our very selves: Wherefore we can fancy our selves in the Presence of our Friends, tho' we are many Miles asunder: Still seem to enjoy Affluence and Prosperity, tho' in the midst of Want; and a perfect Health, tho' we lie languishing upon a sick Bed; and what is more incredible still, after we are laid in our Graves, we continue to live, at least so far as our Memory is dear to our surviving Friends, and the loss of us is ever in their Thoughts. Upon which Account the Death of the Deceased is term'd happy and glorious, and the Survivor, ever respected and honoured. Now, to reflect a little, if the Ties of Good-Nature, Humanity, and reciprocal Kindness, be once torn asunder and disjoyned, Society and Commerce are at an End; neither Families, nor Commonwealths can continue when they are dissolved. And that we may not want Conviction, or being informed of the Value and Dignity of Friendship, the Evil and Uneasiness of Discord and Contention satisfy us how desirable it is. Moreover, to instance in Matters of Fact, and thereby to illustrate the Advantage and Good of Mutual Benevolence: How are Families shatter'd and beggar'd by Dissention? How

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are Kingdoms and popular Communities turn'd into Wilds and Desarts by Ravage and Discord? This is a Torrent too strong to be oppos'd, and turns all Things from their very Foundation, by their violence of Nature. We are informed, that a certain *Agreentine*, a Man of good Letters, has in his Works laid it down as a Truth and *Axiom*, that Union and Agreement in Nature, preserve and save; but that Division and Antipathy efface and destroy: And there is scarce a Man in the World of any Judgment and Rational Reflexion, but without scruple will run in with the Truth of the Assertion. Upon this Score it is, that whenever Friendship leads a Man on to the exposing himself for the Man he loves, or to the sharing a common Danger, that every one is ready to commend and applaud the Action. How loud were the Acclamations of the Theatre in favour of my very good Friend and Companion, *Marcus Pacuvius*, at the first Night of his Play, when the King was in Doubt, which represented *Orestes*. *Pylades* had fixed his Resolution to pass for the Man, and was willing to be sacrificed himself, that he might preserve his Friend. *Orestes*, on the other Hand, endeavour'd to satisfy the Auditory, by all the Arguments of Truth, that himself was the Person, and ought to

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to *die*. And though this in Reality was nothing but Fiction and Show, and yet was attended with such mighty Applause; what may we imagine would have been the Approbation they wou'd have given to Fact? Even here we find the Passions were raised, and Nature very greatly discover'd herself, when a bare Scene of Action commanded the Applause and Commendations of Men, in a Thing they confess'd, merited very much, though themselves were not very forward to put it in Practice. I have thus far in general deliver'd my self upon the Score of Friendship, and if there are Points relating to it left untouched, (as I am apt to imagine there are many) it will better answer your Expectations to be satisfied from those, who understand more of those Things, and whose business lies that way. *Fan*. It will, Sir, be much more to our Satisfaction to receive it from you. I must confess too, that frequently I have been importunate with many about this Subject, and have heard it with attention and pleasure; but there is something so pleasing and agreeably taking in your Expression, that--- *Scæv*. What then wou'd have been your Thoughts and Sentiments, if you had been present in *Scipio's* Garden, when the Subject in Dispute was about the Nature and Constitution of Government? How stren-

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nuously did he assert, and handsomely defend the Cause of Justice, against all the Subtilties and Cunning of *Philus*. *Fan.* Is it a wonder that a Person of Truth and Integrity shou'd zealously defend an Argument of that Nature? *Scæv.* And can that Man be at a loss for Words and Arguments to deliver himself upon the Nature of Friendship, who with Glory and Reputation has adorn'd himself, with the distinguishing Character of a sincere Friend?

VIII. *Læl.* This, *Gentlemen*, is Compulsion with a witness, and had you used other Perswasions and Arguments, you'd have carry'd your Point; for whether I reflect upon the Quality of the Persons that demand my Judgment, or the Nature of the Thing desired, there is enough in either to prevent my Silence, or my not answering your Request: To persue therefore the business of your Demand, on my constant and frequent Meditation on *Friendship*, this Thing seem'd not to be the least worthy of my Thought and Consideration; Whether Friendship is desired and wished for upon the Score of our Wants and Insufficiencies, and that also by an *Interchange* of mutual *Benevolence*, we may have an opportunity to give and receive; which cannot so well be effected without a Friend.

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Friendly Correspondence. I say, it is a Matter of Dispute and Question, whether this be the chief Consideration of Friendship. But to me it seems to proceed from a more Natural and Noble Cause. It is Love, the very Being and Soul of Friendship, that is the Principle of Union, and the Foundation of Good-Nature. Now Counterfeit, and Flattery may serve a turn, and gain the Sycophant's Ends : But in true Friendship there is nothing of feint or the flatterer : For the Nature of it is to be genuine and sincere, and then this is Conviction enough to the World, that Friendship rather seems to take its Rise and Spring from our Natures, than owe its Birth to a Sense of Want and Indigence. I say, it's rather from the Inclination of our Desires, and the Wish of our Soul to be united to the Person we love, than from that Meanness of Thought, which only proposes an End and Advantage by it. Even the brutal and *irrational* World are neither void nor destitute of it : The particular Regard that Brutes have for their Young, while incapacitated to shift for themselves ; the reciprocal Kindness and Affection that appears in their Young, is a manifest indication that they have it wove into their very Nature : But instances of it still appear greater, and shew themselves more nobly in Humane Nature : And, first, it appears and displays it self in
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the Love and indulgent Affection of Parents to their Children, and in that of Children to their Parents back again, which neither are wanting in the one, refused or violated in the other, without the blackest Guilt or highest Deformity. In the next Place, we have the same Passion and degree of Love when we have found out the Man that is very like us, so as whenever we take a view of him, he reflects back the very Picture of us. *For, there is nothing more amiable than Virtue, there's nothing that either attracts or charms so powerfully.* And this is both a common and prevailing Reason with us, to unite our Affections to Persons of sincere Probity and good Manners, though our Acquaintance with them is no other than what we have heard of them. And to instance, to whom is not the Name and Memory of *Fabricius* and *Marcus Curius* dear and grateful, tho' he never saw them? And where is the Man that will not show his disgust and hatred to the bare mentioning of *Tarquin*, *Spurius Cassius*, and *Mælius*, *Pyrrhus* and *Hannibal*, Generals of Courage and Valour, and Rivals to the Greatness and Grandeur of *Rome*? Indeed, *Pyrrhus*, though an Enemy, had our Respect and good Word, because he had Probity and Generosity in him. But *Hannibal* was the Detestation and Odium of

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of *Rome* for his inhuman Behaviour, and barbarity of Temper.

IX. Now if the Charms of Generosity and Actions of Probity be so powerful over us, that not only we have a Value and esteem for Persons endued therewith, tho' we are Strangers to them; and what's more remarkable, a generous Enemy shall not be without his share of our Respect. Is it strange, or at all to be wonder'd at, that our Affections shou'd unite nearer, and our Passions be more powerfully raised, for the Acquaintance and Friendship of those Persons in whom we find Actions of Worth and Dignity, and with whom we may fix our Correspondence? Wherever Sympathy of Affection is fix'd and confirmed by all those Steps and Means, that were conducive to the establishing mutual Love, Gratitude and Benevolence will appear in the highest Instances of zealous *Friendship*; which, were we to suppose to have its Birth from a Sense of our Weakness, and be established upon the Hopes of a surer Assistance in the obtaining our Desires, we must make Friendship take its rise from a very base and mean Principle; and ground it upon the false Foundation of Want and Indigence. And did the Case stand thus, the narrower a Man's Circumstances

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stances were, and the less competent his Fortune for his Support, so much the better wou'd he be capable to begin, entertain, and carry on the Business of Friendship. But this is altogether Mistake and Error: For the Man who is well to pass in the World, who by a provident Fore sight, and necessary Care, has armed himself against Chance and Disappointment, and has sufficient of what he may call properly his own, to set him beyond the Circumstances of Dependance, is, without doubt, best qualified for the purposes and maintaining of Friendship. Was *Scipio* indigent, poor, or mean, that he was obliged to make use of me? or was my Fortune so strait, as to throw me upon a Dependance of him? It was far different in relation to us both; it was his Virtue, and other good Qualities of Mind that wrought my Soul into an admiration of his Person; and they were no ill Accomplishments that gave him an Affection for me, and that prevail'd with him to entertain me as a Friend; which Conversation and Opportunity improved to the best Purposes and Ends of Friendship. Altho' from our Correspondence and Good-fellowship, there follow'd many Advantages and Services to each other, yet our Affections were not rais'd or founded upon the Hopes of this.

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As also our Actions of Generosity and Benevolence, proceed from a natural Propensity and Desire in our Natures to be serviceable to Mankind, rather than from the Motive and Inducement of getting into the good Graces of the World (for Civility and Liberality are not lent upon Usury); so we unite into the Bonds of Friendship, not from a prospect of Interest, or with Mercenary Souls, but think it amiable and worth our Pursuit, from the recompence the Pleasure of loving rewards us with. As for those whose Sentiments run in with the animal World, and have nothing in Design or View but their Pleasure, we shake Hands with them, and retire from their Company. And there is no room for Wonder or Surprise, if we do so, for there their Thoughts and very Souls are taken up and devoted to Objects that are vile and mean; and they neither perceive, nor relish any thing that has Worth in its Nature, or what's beyond the pleasure of Sense and Appetite; and then, for a very good Reason, we dismiss them from being any concern of ours; but then we take it for granted, that whenever Virtue and Probity shine forth with any lustre, it is natural for us to shew a Love and Esteem for the Persons that are adorn'd with it: For when we are once touched with a Tenderness and Respect for such Qualities,

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Qualities, we of Consequence endeavour to ingratiate our selves with the Person whom we have fix'd in our Favour, and take all possible Occasions of improving by his Company and Conversation; so that at last we may arrive to a pitch of mutual Love, and each of us more ready to bestow a Favour, than expect any thing by the Bargain; such an Emulation wou'd not only be Glorious, but render Friendship very Advantageous too; and it is a sure Sign that its Original proceeds from Nature, and not from our own Infirmities: For were Friendship to be founded upon the Basis of Interest, as that fail'd, the Superstructure must naturally totter; but because Nature is ever immutable and constant to its self; Friendship of Consequence, when proceeding from that Source, must be firm and lasting. Thus, Gentlemen, you see, we have traced Friendship to its Original, tho' I doubt, you are too much tired with this, than to desire my farther Thoughts on this Head. *Fan.* Pray, *Laelius*, go on; for as he is the younger, I dare answer for him. *Scæv.* I readily consent to *Fannius's* Request; wherefore, pray, Sir, proceed.

X. *Lael.* I am very ready, Gentlemen, to lay before you the Thoughts and Sentiments,

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ments *Scipio* and my self had about Friendship, and which in our Conversation was frequently the Subject of Discourse. Now it was a Notion of his, that nothing was equally strange, or so uncommon, as Friendship carried on without interruption till Death hath separated the Friends themselves. For it frequently happens, that what's a Pleasure to one, is a Distaste to another; sometimes the Notions of Government and State-Affairs are different. Moreover, he used to say, that he frequently found true from Observation, that a Turn of Fortune, or the Incumbrance of old Age changed the Soul, and altered the Disposition of the Mind. He began his Observation from the Example of Children, who Play-fellows, and much of an Age would unite and sympathize in all their Affections, but drew back into coldness and indifferency when they began to look towards Manhood; yet let it be supposed it grew up with them longer, and they continued in a fair Correspondence till they could write Man; then they were commonly divided and separated by Accidents and Occasions that fell in their way; perhaps a Mistress, a Wife, or their Pleasure, or something they both passionately valued, and yet but one cou'd be the better for: Were their
Advances

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Advances carried on farther, and no Accident yet had given occasion for a Breach, it is common to divide and fall off when they become Candidates for a Court-Favour, and are Competitors for a Title and Name of Honour. And really, what greater Bane of Friendship, or Ruin of Benevolence shows its self in the World, than the general desire of Serving our selves, and regarding nothing but our own Interest? A desire and struggle for Greatness and Honour have not only dissolved the strictest Alliances and Friendship, but have turned them into Odiums and Detestations; so that from being the best of Friends, Men are often changed into the worst of Enemies. But farther, there are other Causes that give interruption to Friendship, and are the Effects of Discord and Division, which I think unblameable; that is, when the Demands of either are unreasonable and guilty; when Modesty or Honesty must be sacrificed to serve their lewd and treacherous Purposes. Now, the Man who is so honest and just, as to dissent and flie off upon this Account, is condemned as guilty of the Breach of Friendship, by those he in Conscience and Equity could not joyn with, and therefore refused his Compliance: But those Sort of Men say, they give assurances from their Demands,

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mands, that they are willing to wade through all Things, and stop at nothing to serve their Friends. This Quarrel, and frivolous Complaint of theirs, not only puts a stop to, and extinguishes Familiarity and Freedom of *Address*; but gives Birth to eternal *Resentments* and *Animosities*: And, in fine, it was the Opinion of *Scipio*, that a Person was not only Prudent and Wise, but might reckon himself particularly Happy, if he could steer free, and keep clear of those Occasions of Interruptions which, like so many Rocks, make the Voyage hazardous.

XI. If you please therefore, Gentlemen, I shall first make an Enquiry, to find out, How far Love is a necessary Ingredient to Friendship. Now, to Illustrate a little: Was it necessary, that the Friends of *Coriolanus*, and Persons of his Acquaintance, shou'd be Rebels in Complaisance to him, and Ravage their Country for to pleasure their Correspondent? And in like manner, Was it an Obligation, by being the Friends of *Viscelinus* and *S. Mælius*, that they must run in with their Villainous and Base Designs, to seize the Reins of Government, and usurp the Command of the *Empire*? But contrary to this, we find, that Friendship and Acquaintance were not able to prevail with *Quintus Tubero*; or many o-

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thers

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thers of the Familiars of *T. Grachus* to stand by him when he inflamed the Common-Wealth, and Mutinied against the State : And *C. Blossius* of *Cuma*, a Guest, and Acquaintance of your Relations, *Scævola*, Petitioning me (who then was one of the Committee, with *Lænaus* and *Rupilius* the Consuls, about Business of the Publick) to stand his Friend, and bring him off, gave in this as a Reason, That *T. Grachus* was so intimate and dear to him, that he thought himself bound, and obliged to Perform, and Prosecute whatever his Friend would have him do. Very good, said I, and if *T. Grachus* had enjoyned you to have fired the Capitol, you willingly would have taken it upon you, and Executed it accordingly ? My Friend, says he, wou'd never have entertained a Thought of that Nature. Well, but imagine he might have demanded it of you : Why then, says he, I must have Complied, and should have done it accordingly. Ye behold, my *Friends*, what a Villainous Confession here is of his own ; and he was not only as good as his Word, but his after Actions have Demonstrated, that his Intentions were worse than he said. The Presumption and Raimness of *Grachus* he did not follow, but out-strip ; he did not joyn, nor go along with him in his *Fury* against

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against the Common-Wealth, but was a Leader himself, and the chief *Incendiary*: But being apprehensive of a new *Impeachment*, he retired into *Asia*, and joyn'd with the Common Enemy; and at last, was rewarded as a Traytor and Rebel to the Common-Wealth. To Offend and be Guilty, upon the Score of Friendship, is neither Excuse nor Mitigation of the Crime. It has already been laid down for Truth, *That Virtue and Friendship are Inseparable*; and then, if Virtue be Disregarded, Friendship must cease of Course. If therefore, our Definitions are Right, we shall find the highest pitch of Wisdom to consist in a mutual Readiness of Obliging our Friends, where the Demands do not interfere with Justice: For, you must know, we at present confine our selves to such a Sort of Friends, as we have either seen, or heard of in our Converse with the World. From Friends of this Rank and Quality, we shou'd take our Example; and even from these who are Remarkably Eminent for Wisdom and Prudence; who have deliver'd down to us, by the Records of Fame, that *P. Æmilius*, and *C. Luscinus*, were very Familiar and Friendly. They were more than once honour'd together with the high Dignity of the *Consulate*,

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and were twice united in the Office of the *Censors*. Tradition has informed us also, that *M. Curius*, and *T. Coruncanius*, were not only Intimate and Familiar with these Persons ; but maintain'd also a strict Friendship, and kept a very good Correspondence between themselves ; and yet, there was no room for Suspicion, that any of their Demands upon their Friend were disagreeable to Honesty, the Duties of Conscience, or the Obligations they had to be True to the State. It is entirely foreign, and contrary to the Character of those Great Men, to imagine any Thing of that Nature : But suppose there might have been a Knave among them ; yet I am assured his Attempts upon the rest would have been vain, and that his Expectation would never have been answer'd by Men of the greatest Integrity and Honour : For either to Demand or Practise any Thing Villainous or Unjustifiable, created, and rais'd the very same Degrees of Abhorrence among them : But yet, *C. Carbo* and *C. Cato*, and his Brother *Caius*, follow'd the Steps of *Titus Gracchus* ; the latter indeed, did not show any great Inclination to it at the beginning ; tho' at the last he was as active as any of them.

XII. This

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XII. This then, ought to be a firm and unalterable Law in Friendship, That we never propose what's Vicious or Criminal, or give way to the Desires of our Friend, whenever they bear that Stamp and Character: For, it is *foolish* and *ridiculous* to plead Not Guilty, to Actions of Dishonesty and ill-Fame; (but much more so, when they tend to Embroil the State, and will be Destructive to the Government) because the Humour of a Friend requires us to Gratifie him: As for us, *Gentlemen*, we are placed in a higher Station than ordinary, from whence we ought to look down with Circumspection, that we may be able to foresee the further Dangers that may threaten the State; for the Way of the World is strangely perverted, and the Custom of our Ancestors turned from their wonted Course. *Titus Gracchus's* Aim and Endeavour was, to be Absolute in Power and Command, without Controul; and accordingly he had, for a short space of Time, the Reins of Government in his own Hands: This was an Usurpation New and Strange to the People of *Rome*; and what were the Consequences of it, may be seen by the share of ill Usage that *Scipio*, after the Death of that Man,

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met with from his Friends; and really, it is a very melancholy Story to reflect on: For our Hands had been just embrewed in the Blood of *Tiberius Gracchus*, and, upon that Account, we calmly suffer'd *Carbo*, his Accomplice, and Partner in Villany, to escape Scot free. Now, *Caius Gracchus* is invested with the Tribuneship, and what we must expect from the Ambition of his Factious Soul, is hard to determine: However, I am apprehensive, lest the spreading Contagion shou'd take Root, and when once fix'd, over run the whole Soil; of which, what greater Instances can we have, than the fatal Consequences that attended first the *Gabinian* Law, and two Years after, the *Cassian*. In short, methinks, I have the Prospect of a Disunion between the *Senate* and *People*, and an *Apprehension*, lest the Popularity shou'd carry all Things before them; for the Generality of the *People* seem rather to foment and raise Sedition, than contrive how to stop and appease the Torrent of Faction. These Instances therefore, may serve to shew us, That no Body would ever undertake such dangerous Designs, was he not encouraged to it by the Hopes of meeting Friends and Accomplices. Wherefore, we must give good Men this Caution,
that

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that if ever they have the ill Luck to fall into such Acquaintance, they should not think the Ties of Friendship so binding, as to compel them, in Defence of their Friends, to harbour any treacherous Designs against the State; for there are Laws establish'd for the Punishment of Offenders, which are as rigorous against the Abettors and Instruments, as against the Authors and Ring Leaders of the Faction. *Themistocles* was a great and powerful General, as ever appear'd at the Head of a *Grecian* Army: In the War with the *Persians*, he utterly Defeated them, and made *Greece* owe its Liberty to the Power of his Victorious Arm. The Envy that ensued this glorious Action, caused him to be banish'd his Country. He knew he ought, and accordingly endeavour'd to put up the Injury, but his Resentment ran too high, to forgive his Ungrateful Country: And, as *Coriolanus* did, about twenty Years ago, he was resolv'd to Revenge the Affront. Neither one, nor the other, found any Man that wou'd sacrifice his Country to the Resentment of his Friend; but despairing of Success, they grew Desperate, and fell upon their own Swords, that they might not survive the Disappointment. Wherefore, the Agreement of wicked Men ought not to

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be palliated under the Excuse of Friendship, but rather be exposed to the Rigour of the Law ; to let every Man know, that Friendship gives him no Priviledge of Ruining his Country : Tho' indeed, as Affairs go now, I see little probability of its coming to pass. However, I wou'd be no less solicitous for the Preservation of the State, when *I am in the Grave*, than now, *whilst I am one of its Members*.

XIII. To ask nothing of our Friends but what is Just and Honourable ; not to with-hold our Hands till they ask our Assistance, but to be always, and on all Occasions, ready to oblige them ; freely to give them our Advice ; to be biassed in our Actions by their Authority and Judgment ; to Exhort and Admonish them, not only openly, but sharply too, upon Occasion, and to Subject our selves to their more prudent Exhortations, are Rules which ought to be laid down as the very Foundation to all Friendship. There are a parcel of *Paradoxes* in great favour with the *Grecian Sages*, that I think, are something very Singular and Uncommon : Tho' indeed, what is there, that by *their Quirks and Subtilties* they cannot make plausible : A Man ought not (say they) to contract a Friendship
with

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with too many, lest the Weight of the whole shou'd lie upon his own Shoulders; for every Man hath enough to do to mind his own Concerns, without embarrassing himself with the Affairs of his Neighbours : It is the safest way therefore, not to knit the Bands of Friendship so tight, but that we may loosen, or contract them, as its suits with our Convenience ; for the true Basis of a Happy Life, is founded upon our own Security : But it is impossible for the Mind of Man to enjoy that Blessing, or be free from Anxiety and Trouble, who bears the Weight of so many Peoples Burdens. Others there are, who give Friendship a more uncourteous Treatment ; and, as I have briefly hinted, advise us to discard Love and Benevolence, and fix our Friendship upon the firmer Basis (as they term it) of Profit and Convenience ; so that the less Strength and Abilities a Man hath to stem the over-bearing Current of ill Fortune, the more Friends he shou'd make, and, in their Assistance, seek that Defence which he himself is not arm'd with : Hence it is that Women endeavour to protect themselves *under the Bulwark of Friendship*, with more Application than Men ; the Oppressed than the Powerful, and those that are overwhelmed with Waves of Adversity, rather than those
which

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which enjoy the Calms of Prosperity. *This is a piece of Policy, for which they are ever to be Envied and Applauded; and they might pluck the Sun out of the Firmament, with as little Prejudice to Mankind, as deprive us of Friendship, which is the greatest Blessing the Gods have bestow'd upon us.* For, as for that Security, which is founded on the Bottom of Self-Interest, it only carries with it a fair Outside, but is not always to be depended on; neither is it reasonable to avoid the Undertaking, or desist from the Prosecution of an honourable Action, meerly because Fatigue and Trouble attend it. If we once have such an Aversion to Trouble and Uneasiness; why do we not lay aside all Pretences to Virtue too, of which we give evident Proofs, when by our Care and Concern, we show a Dislike and Aversion to those Things which are directly contrary to it? Thus, *Honesty* takes a Distaste and Antipathy against *Knavery*, *Temperance* against *Sensuality*, and *Bravery* against *Cowardice*. And accordingly, we see a Man of an upright Mind, to have an utter Abhorrence to all Unjust Dealings; nothing to be more hateful to, and beneath a Man of Courage, than *Timourousness* and *Cowardice*; nothing more shocking to the Modest Man, than

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than *Lewdness* and *Debauchery*. This therefore is peculiar to a Mind well disposed, not only to be pleased with those Things which tend to the advancing of Virtue, but to be sensibly affected with the contrary. Since therefore Trouble and Uneasiness sometimes ruffles and disorders the Wise Man's Breast, and will ever work the same Effect upon him, unless we could suppose him divested of those Passions, and Affections to which our frail Nature is exposed: What warrantable Grounds can we have for utterly extirpating, and banishing Friendship from Common Society, because Trouble and Concern may possibly sometimes attend it? For, was the Mind insensible of those Affections, we should be but a very few Degrees superior, not only to Brutes, but even to Stocks and Stones. Were some People to have the Hearing, we should have reason to believe Virtue to be something very *crabbed and hard to be digested*; when on the contrary, in all Respects, and particularly in Cases of Friendship, she seems to be of a very condescending and tractable Disposition: From whence it is, that sympathizing with the Fortune of our Friends, we are chearful and transported at their Prosperity, but upon a Turn of Fate, our Brow is ruffled, and our Joy

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tracted with their Fortune. Wherefore, as I said before, we have no more Reason to discard Friendship, because it sometimes lays upon our own Shoulders the Burthen of our Friend, than we have to shake Hands with Virtue, because Care and Trouble help to make up her Retinue.

XIV. But Friendship, when once contracted (as I have said before), *If there appear any Sparks of Virtue to which the Mind, by a Conformity to its Excellencies, may be united*, must of Necessity spring and shoot up into a mutual Love: For, how absurd is it to be pleased with such Vanity and Trifles, as Honour, Wealth, Glory, fine Houses, Ornaments, &c. yet be neither charm'd nor touch'd with the Beauties of a Virtuous Mind, tho' induced with so many Qualifications both of receiving, and exciting Love; especially when there is so great a Satisfaction placed in the *Acknowledgement, and Recompence of past Favours, and in the mutual Return of Obligations and good Offices*. To which we may add another Consideration of no small Weight; namely, there is no Cause so powerful in the producing of its Effects, as Resemblance and Conformity in Mind and Manners, is to create Friendship. Conformable to which, we see

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see good Men to have a *natural* Tendency, and Respect one for the other ; and from the natural Likeness in their Temper associate together as Friends and Kinsmen ; for nothing gives greater Proof of its Tendency and Love for similar Qualities, than Nature. This therefore, *Gentlemen*, I think very plain, that there is a necessary Tie of Love and Benevolence between good Men ; which I take to be by Nature constituted as the very Fountain and Foundation from whence all the Springs of Friendship proceed, and upon which it is Built : Neither is this Love and Benevolence confined to narrow Bounds, but generously diffuses it self thro' all Mankind : For Virtue exempts its self from none, is ever Courteous and Condescending ; the wisest Counsellor, and safest Guard to save whole States from Ruin : Which Qualities she cou'd never be endued with, had she any Aversion for the Embraces of the Meaner Sort : They therefore, that place Advantage and Profit, as the Support of Friendship, seem to me, to take away the most agreeable Part, and surest Cement of it : For, the Love and Good-will of our Friend, is infinitely to be preferr'd before the Advantage and Convenience we receive from him ; for, *it is his Endeavour*

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deavour and Intentions that give season to the Action, and render the Performance of it welcome and agreeable. The Necessity therefore we lie under, of being obliged to our Neighbours, is so far from being the Original of Friendship, that its Rays shine out with greater Lustre in none, than in those whose Minds are adorned with Virtue, and their Fortune guarded from the Strokes of Adversity, by Affluence and Wealth. I cannot indeed say, but that it is sometimes necessary that we shoud stand in need of our Friends Assistance; for what progress could we have made either in our Studies, or Knowledge of our Affections, if Scipio had not sometimes, either at Home or Abroad, stood in need of my Assistance and Advice? Friendship is therefore not to be grounded upon the Foundation of Profit; but Profit is rather a necessary Emanation from it.

XV. We are therefore not to give a rich Man the Hearing, when he Disputes about Friendship, which is not grounded upon Reason and Experience. For who is there that would so far resign his Repose and Satisfaction to the gaudy Vanity of *Affluence and Prosperity*, as to barter the Love and Good-will of his Neighbours, for

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for a little Pelf and filthy Lucre? The Life of such a Man is not a whit preferable to that of the greatest Tyrant, who attended with a thousand Fears and Suspicions, hath shook Hands with Security and Charity, and (without supposing Love of so extensive a Quality, as to reach even those we Fear and Suspect) disrobed himself of that Guard and Defence, which arises from a mutual Confidence, and sincere Friendship. We often indeed, see a Shew of Friendship put on for the serving some Exigency, or carrying on some Design; but if, in the mean Time, as it sometimes happen, Jade Fortune shou'd Jilt them, they then may easily perceive what Power Interest hath upon Mens Affections, and what Adorations was paid rather to the Money, than the *Friend*. This *Tarquin* furnished the *Proud*, seem'd to find too true, when in his Banishment he said, he had founded the Fidelity of his Acquaintance; and when he could no longer Flatter their Hopes, nor Reward their Assiduity, he then could distinguish *his Friends* from *Parasites*. Tho' indeed, so insupportable, and so unreasonable was his *Pride*, that it were next kin to a Miracle, if he found any that were sound at the *Bottom*. But as unfit as the Disposition

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position of that Unhappy Gentleman was, for the Cultivation of Friendship; yet we shall find the Power and Wealth of Great Men, to be sometimes as great a Bar to the Progress of it. For Dame Fortune is not only Blind herself, but infatuates and casts a Mist before the Eyes of her Favourites, and, with the sweet and agreeable Draughts of *Wealth* and *Honour*, often mixes the bitter Ingredients of *Arrogance* and *Disdain*; and what can be more Insupportable than a Rich and Fortunate *Coxcomb*? How many Instances have we of Gentlemen of a Courteous and Affable Disposition, growing giddy with their Fortune; laying aside those Commendable Qualifications; suing for new Friends, and from that Height of Power, and Riches to which Chance hath exalted them, looking down with Scorn and Contempt upon their Old Acquaintance. And what greater Proof can they give of their Folly, than the Pains they take to furnish themselves with those gaudy Superfluities of *Equipage* and *Ornaments*, without any Regard or Concern for the Cultivation of *true Friendship*, that *inestimable and necessary Ingredient to a Happy Life*. These Men take Pains for they know not who, and labour for a Transitory and Precarious Good; which perhaps they in a short Time must

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must yield up to the superior Force, of some more powerful Neighbour : Whereas, Friendship is an Estate for Life, so sure, agreeable and lasting a Possession; that were we for *ever* to enjoy those slippery Gifts of Fortune; yet, was Friendship excluded, our Life would be a Burthen to us.

XVI. But to proceed no farther in this, we must now determine, how far the Bounds and Limits of Friendship ought to be Extended: Concerning this Point, there are three Opinions; neither of which, in my Mind, are either True or Honourable: The First is, That we should have the same Love and Respect for our Friends, as we pay to our selves: The Second is, That we should measure our Love to our Friends, by the Benevolence and Affection they tender us: The Third is, That we ought to pay the same Defe-
rence, and to have the same Regard for them, as they have for themselves. These are Three Opinions, with which, for my part, I can by no means be satisfied. The first of them must not be allowed of; for how many Instances have we of Mens Actions, and accomplishing (to oblige and serve their Friends) Things, which, for their own Sakes alone, they never would have undertaken. When we
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cringe and bow to a Villain, in behalf of our Friends; or when, in Defending them from Slander and Calumny, we inveigh against their Accusers with more Warmth than ordinary; such Instances carry with them Tokens of a Noble and Generous Temper, when done to serve our Friends; tho' were they to proceed from a Concern for our selves, they would have a very different Appearance. Besides, how many Cases are there, in which a Man of a good and generous Disposition, wou'd recede from his Right, and neglect his own Advantage, that his Friend might reap the Benefit of it. Neither is the Second Opinion, which confines Friendship within an equal and mutual Return of Good Offices, founded upon better Grounds than the former; for the taking account of Obligations received, and ballancing them with the Favours we have bestow'd, seems to be a limiting Friendship within too narrow a Compass, and a curtailing its Properties and Excellencies: For in my mind, it seems of too generous and prolifick a Quality, than to make Observations of Favours, either bestowed or received, or to be under Apprehensions, lest an Obligation should be forgot, its Favours wasted, or more conferr'd, than our Friends are able

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able to Return : And, as to the Third Opinion, that we shou'd pay the same Deference to our Friends that they have for themselves, that holds good less than either of the other ; because there are some Cases, in which, by a continual Series of Misfortunes, Men are brought to Despair, and their Minds render'd as abject as their Fortunes. In such Instances therefore, we ought not to proportion our Love and Good-Will towards our Friend, to the Opinion and Respect he entertains of himself ; but rather to endeavour to raise his sinking Spirits, and from Despondency, to bring him to hope for a better Turn of Fate : We must therefore constitute other Limits, within which Friendship ought to be confined ; but first I must take Notice of an Assertion, to which *Scipio* cou'd never be Reconciled ; namely, That we ought not to give too great a loose to Friendship, but confine it within such Bounds, as always to be prepared for the possibility of a Rupture. This, in his Opinion, was a Tenet not only Base, but Prejudicial to Friendship ; and he accordingly, could never be perswaded that it proceeded from the Mouth of *Bias*, who was accounted one of the Seven Sages, but rather seem'd to be the Sentiments of some *Villain* or *ambitious Knave*, who was

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endeavouring to wrest the Power into his own Hands : For, how can I pretend to be a Friend to any Man, when at the same Time, I find a possibility of being at Enmity with him ? Besides, at this rate, we shall be under a Necessity of rejoicing at the false Steps our Friend makes, that we may have the more Opportunities, and greater Pretences of Rebuking him ; and for the same Reason, must we envy our Friends good Fortune, and be Uneasy at their successful Management : Such Sentiments therefore (whoever is the Author of them), not only derogates from the Principles of true Friendship, but utterly destroys them too : Wherefore, such a Doctrine ought not to be inculcated ; but we ought rather to use such a Precaution in the Election of our Friends, as never to fix our Affection upon such, as we have reason to suppose we may hereafter dislike : But, if it is our Misfortune to err so far in our Choice, *Scipio's* Opinion was rather to endeavour the Continuance of our Engagements, than ever to admit of the Thoughts of a Disagreement.

XVII. Friendship therefore, ought to be limited within such Bounds, as when once the Morals of the Two Parties

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ties are Reform'd and Regular ; there then thou'd be so perfect a Harmony and Agreement, both in their Designs and Councils ; that, if by any ill Turn of Fate, the Life and Reputation of either of them, should be endanger'd from the Unjust Intentions of his Friends, in which it is not Safe to assist him ; in such Cases, (unless Infamy it self should follow the Design) Friendship must be stretch'd to its utmost Limits, and demands us to Defend our Friend ; for there must be some Allowance granted to *the Dignity of Friendship* ; but we must have some Regard to Reputation too . Nor ought we to set light by the Love of our Country-men, because it is a great Instrument in the forwarding our Undertakings ; and tho' we ought not to make use of base Ends in the attaining of it, yet, on the other Hand, *Virtue when accompanied with Love and Benevolence*, is too great an Advantage to be neglected. To return to *Scipio*, whose whole Discourse was upon the Topick of Friendship, he wou'd often complain of the Vanity of Mankind, in taking a singular Pleasure in letting Company know how Rich they were, and how their Stock of Kine, or Slaves were yearly Encreased ; but not a Man of them wou'd reckon up the Number of his Friends, or take any

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Notice that he had any. He thought it ridiculous to observe with what Caution Men proceeded in the Choice of those Trifles, tho' at the same time they neglected Friendship, a much more valuable Commodity, and took no Notice of those Characters and Marks, by which they might distinguish a Man, that was worthy to be admitted to their Breast. Let us therefore give the Preference to Men of a steady and constant Soul; tho' there be few such to be found; and, whether a Man be endued with such Qualities or no, is hard to judge, till we have try'd him: However, the Friendship we contract with him, will give us a Specimen of his Qualities, so that our Intimacy forestalls our Judgment, and we must be his Friend, before we have an opportunity of sounding him. As therefore a skillful Charioteer wou'd hardly give a young metal-some Horse the Reins, till he hath tried him; so neither should a prudent Man give Friendship too great a loose, nor put too much Confidence in the Acquaintance, till he is sure of the Man. Some Men are so shallow, that they are won by Trifles, and tempted with the gilded Bait, expose to the View of Mankind their Levity and Unconstancy: The Souls of some other Men, tho' fortified against such

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such weak Temptations, are yet not able to hold out against the Force of some more powerful Allurement; but could we find any that scorn to sacrifice their Friend to their Interest, yet where shall we find the Man, that is so far Proof against the glittering Temptations of *Grandeur*, *Wealth*, and *Empire*, as, were those engaging Advantages to be offer'd him on one Hand, and the Blessings of *Friendship* on the other, he wou'd not look with Scorn and Contempt upon the latter, and with Joy adhere to the former? For we are all *Flesh* and *Blood*; and Power hath something so enticing and so dazzling belongs to it, that it is no Wonder, if frail Nature, charm'd with its *Beauties*, is not able at last to resist its Temptation. Besides, shou'd we by betraying our Friend, arrive at the expected pitch of *Grandeur*, we then think we have a Plea for our *Ingratitude*, and that those powerful Motives that induced us to break our Engagements, will excuse us in the Eyes of the *World*, and draw a Curtain over the Rupture. True Friendship therefore is seldom to be found among Great Men and *Courtiers*; for where shall we meet with a Man that is so just to his Engagements, as to contribute to the Advancement or *Grandeur* of his Friend, by

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neglecting his own? But to omit such Instances, how shocking and terrible an Aspect hath *Friendship* in *Adversity*; and where shall we find that *Heroe* of a Man that dare continue True in our *Adversity*, and be a Friend to our Misfortunes? tho' *Ennius* is certainly in the right of it, when he says,

*To Fortunes Smiles, each Man a Friend will be,
But let her Frown, and then our Friends we see.*

Yet those are Circumstances that give very convincing Proofs of the Levity and Weakness of those Mens Souls who either look down upon their *distressed* Friends with Scorn and Contempt, from their Summit of Fortune; or as they see the Clouds gathering together, and threatening their Friend with Destruction, prepare for a Storm and secure their own Persons, by forsaking him.

XVIII. That Man therefore, who neither puffed up with the *Favours of Fortune*, or deterred by her *Frowns*, behaves himself so, as to give Proofs in both Circumstances of his constant, and firm Resolution; let me tell you, we ought to look upon him as a very extraordinary *Person*, and Respect him as something more than

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than *Mortal*. Now, this Steadiness and Resolution, which is so necessary an Ingredient in Friendship, is founded upon a Principle of *Faithfulness*; but take that Prop away, and the Superstructure immediately totters. Besides, we should take care to pitch upon a plain, honest, well-dealing *Gentleman*, whose Humour is conformable and agreeable to our own: These Qualifications are Branches which proceed from the same Root with Sincerity, and it is impossible for us to trust a Man of a *double and shuffling Genius*; neither is it to be supposed, that there's any Confidence to be put in a Temper; that is *Opposite* to, and clashes with their own. Not to be too forward in Accusing our Friends, nor too credulous in believing what Report may say to their Disadvantage, is another Qualification which bears some relation likewise to Fidelity; and ought to be a *Characteristick* of that Man with whom we intend an Intimacy. From whence, as I have hinted before, we may fairly infer, that good Men alone are capacitated for enjoying the Blessings of Friendship, in which there are two Things to be observed, which I take to be the Essential Quality of a Good and Wise Man: The first is ever *to deal plainly, and without Dissimulation*; for it is

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is more Genteel and Honourable by half, to tell a Man to his Face, that we have an Aversion for him, than to palliate our Distaste under a Species of Friendship. The second is, *not only to defend our Friend from the Calumny of a Slandorous Tongue, but even not so much as to suspect him, of Double Dealing.* But the most necessary Ingredient, and what gives a Relish to the whole, is a peculiar grace and sweetness in our Expressions, join'd to a Courteous and Affable Behaviour : As for Morosness and Severity, it carries something of Grandeur and Authority in it ; but that ought to be laid aside in Friendship, and give way to a frank and winning Complacency.

XIX. Here some People are apt to start a very difficult and odd Question, Whether or no, *we ought to deal by our new Friends, if found worthy of our Acquaintance, as we do by our Horses, and always give the last the Prebeminence?* But this, in my mind, is a Query that a Man of Sense or Honesty wou'd blush at ; for Friendship is never surfeiting, but like old Wine by a long continuance, gains a more agreeable Relish, and really verifies the Old Proverb, which advises *to eat many a Peck of Salt with a Man, before we settle a perfect Friendship with him.* A New Acquaintance indeed, provided it is Promising, ought not
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to be neglected ; but then we ought to act nothing in Favour of that, which may be any ways a Detriment to the Old one: For there's great Stress to be laid upon a lasting and old Acquaintance. (To mention again the foregoing Instance), I fancy, we shall find very few, who, were there no Inconvenience in it, would prefer a young unmanaged Horse, to one that he is used to Ride on ; neither in such Cases only is Custom Prevalent, but in inanimate Things too : For we daily see People, that have been used to Woods and Mountains, at last so much admire Solitude, as not to be dragged from it without Reluctancy and Regret : But the strongest Cement to preserve Friendship when once united, is for both Parties to be upon a Level, and neither of them to claim a Precedency, that possible may be due to their Merit. Instances of such a Difference are frequently to be met with: Thus, *Scipio's* Virtue shined forth with greater Lustre than any of the whole *State*, yet he was so far from valuing himself for his Merit, that he never took Place of *Philus*, *Rupilius*, or *Memmius*, nor ever put himself before his Friends, tho' of the meanest Rank ; nay, he was so condescending, as to pay a peculiar Deference to his Brother *Q. Maximus*, purely because
he

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he was Elder; tho' indeed *Q. Maximus* was a Gentleman that made a very considerable Figure any where, except in *Scipio's* Presence; but in that Respect, *Scipio* was of a very generous Temper, and ever took Delight in embellishing the Characters of his Friends and Acquaintance with the Lustre of his own Merit. So eminent an Example we ought to follow; and if by our Virtue, Wit, or Fortune, we have raised our selves to a Degree above our Neighbours, we ought to impart, and let them share in the Advantage. Thus, were we descended from mean Parents, and had we Friends whose Understanding and Estates were none of the largest, we ought to help them out with our Fortunes, and grace their Persons with our Credit and Authority. So we read in Fabulous Stories of young Heroes, who thro' the World's being ignorant of their Birth and Quality, have been brought up to Drudgery and Labour; and tho', when they have come to the Knowledge of their Parents, they have been proved either the Off-spring of some God or Emperor; yet they have still retain'd a natural Affection and Respect for their *Foster-Fathers*, whom they so long thought their true Ones. How much more therefore is such a Duty owing
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to our known and lawful Parents; but to say no more upon this Head, we shall find the Lustre of Virtue, and all other Qualifications never to shine so bright, as when it displays its Beams upon its Neighbours.

XX. As therefore the more eminent Party, when he hath once knit the Bond of Friendship, ought to place himself upon a Level with his Inferior; so on the other Hand, we ought not to be concern'd because our Friends excel us, either in *Merit, Dignity, or Fortune*, tho' Complaints and Upbraiding, is almost a necessary Concomitant of Inferiority; and the more so, when the inferior Party thinks he hath reason to Brag of past Services; but it is very odious and insupportable, thus to Upbraid us with an Obligation, which the Party alone on whom it is Conferred, and not he that confers it, ought to acknowledge. Wherefore, it is not enough for a Person of a greater Merit, to *humble himself*; but there's yet a farther Duty required of him, and to render himself wholly Agreeable, he must Endeavour to raise his Friend to a higher pitch, than his inferior Qualities can pretend to. For there are some, who are of such an Uneasy Temper, that
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they lessen the Blessings of Friendship; and pall its Relish, by fancying themselves Contemptible in the Eyes of their Friends; tho' this seldom happens, unless among Persons that are sensible of their little Worth, and Conscious that they deserve to be slighted; in which Case, we shou'd Endeavour to take away the Suspicion, elevate their Hopes, and perswade them into a better Opinion of their own Merit. Now, there are two Things to be observed in the bestowing our Favours; the first is, that we exert our selves to the utmost of our Ability; the second that we bestow such Favours, as the Dignity and Merit of our Friend can lay claim to. For, were we in never so high a Station, it would be impossible to Reward them all alike, or adorn them with the highest Honours. Thus we see the Interest of *Scipio* could obtain *Pub. Rutilius* the Consular Dignity, tho' he could not oblige his Brother *Lucius* with the same Favour. But let us push the Case farther, and suppose a Man had Interest enough to oblige his Friends in any Thing; yet even then he must not confer his Favours promiscuously, nor heap more upon his Friend, than his Qualifications can pretend to. The Temper therefore of the Parties must be well Grounded, and Settled,

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Settled, before we can judge of the Sincerity of their Friendship; neither are those, whom, in our younger Days, we chose as Companions in our Sports and Diversions, to be always look'd upon as fit Persons to contract a Friendship with; for, was that the Case, our Nurse and School-Master, by the Right of Old Acquaintance, might justly lay claim to our whole Affections: Some Respect indeed, is due to them, who first had our Esteem and Reverence, tho' it cannot come up to that which Friendship requires; for otherwise Friendship wou'd be founded upon a very unfirm Basis: for a different Behaviour is the natural Concomitant of different Inclinations, which first break the Ties of Friendship, and cause the Rupture. And it is this Difference alone, in *Humour* and *Behaviour*, that makes it almost impossible for any True Friendship, or Real Intimacy to be contracted between Good and Bad Men. It is besides, a very good Caution in relation to Friendship, not to let our Love be so immoderate, or ill placed, as to have any Thought, that may tend to the Prejudice of our Friend; for, (to return to Fabulous Stories) had *Neoptolemus* listened to the Tears and Entreaties of his Tutor *Lycomedes*, he never had been Master of *Troy*. There often happen very
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urgent Reasons to depart from our Friends; in which Case, whoever dissuades his Friend to lay aside the Thoughts of a Departure, because he shall not be able to bear the Loss of him, shews great Proof of an Effeminate, weak Soul, and gives us reason to suppose he is more concern'd for himself than his Friend. In all Things therefore, we must consider, not only what we should require of our Friends, but what, were the Case our own, we should be willing to grant them.

XXI. It sometimes happens, that a fatal Necessity appears to give interruption to Friendship, and break off Correspondence; I mean those Friendships, and that Correspondence which are entertain'd among Persons of a lower Quality than Wise Men and Philosophers. This is frequent and common in the World for Men to behave themselves ill, either towards those who were nearly Related as Friends, or towards those, whom, upon the Score of common Humanity, they shou'd have kept fair and even with, whose bad Conduct, and ill Management, is a Reflection upon those they are familiar with. From Friendships of this Nature, and Familiars of this Disposition; we shou'd gradually Retire; and agreeable to what
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I have heard *Cato* frequently say, we shou'd prudently dissolve them, and not violently throw them off at once ; except some Injustice that is Remarkable, and of a Monstrous Size, blazons them for *Villains*, so that neither Probity nor Reputation can be preserved pure in their Acquaintance and Familiarity ; which, in case we are required to withdraw on a sudden, and bid *Adieu* to such Companions. But should it be (as it is not uncommon) for Men to be changeable in their Manners and Dispositions, or to disagree in Point of Politicks ; (I hint by the way, what I just now mention'd of Persons in a common Rank, and not of Wise Men and Philosophers) in such a Case, Discretion and Prudence shou'd lead us on, not only to avoid Violence in our going off ; but even dissuade us from contracting Hatred and *Animosities* at the Rupture : For nothing looks so ill, and below a Man, as to be at Defiance and Enmity with him, that was once our Acquaintance and familiar Friend. My Friends, ye very well know, *Scipio* withdrew his Correspondence from *Quintus Pompeius* for my Sake, and he forbore any longer Familiarity with my Colleague *Metellus*, upon some different Maxims and Notions of Government : But in both these Instances of Division, he acted both the Prudent and wise Man ;

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for he dissolved the Correspondence without retaining any *Malignancy* of Ill-Nature or *Resentment*. The *first* Duty and Caution for *Friends*, is this, That they take all possible Care to prevent Disturbance and Dissention; but if such Things shou'd happen, as is possible they may, then they shou'd so bring it about, that Friendship shou'd leisurely sink and die away, and not be extinguish'd at once. Prudence and Caution shou'd always prevent the growth of Animosity and Ill-Will, when Friendship and Familiarity are laid aside; from whence, as from a Fountain, flow Reproach, Revilings, and Contempt, which, tho' they are very Disagreeable, yet we must endeavour to bear with them, and pay so much Deference to our former Ties of Friendship, as to blame the Aggressor only, and not him that receives the Affront: There is one Thing that will guard against, and prevent all those Evils and Disturbances; that is, neither to take Friends upon Trust, nor to chuse those that have very little to recommend them. He is the only Person fit for Acquaintance and Friendship, who is endued with such Qualities, and has so much of Worth and Dignity in him, as to give Mankind a Value for his Person. Persons of this Quality are not
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many in Number ; as indeed, all Things that are Valuable, are scarce, and it will be difficult, as well as tedious, to find out the Man whom we may call *Finish'd*, and hath nothing of *Blemish* and *Imperfection* in him. As for the greater part of the World, they regard and value all Things, either to the price they will bring, or the Advantage they shall get by them ; they rate their *Friends* as they do their *Cattle* or *Effects* ; what is the most Serviceable, and will bring them most *Money*, and please them best, is first in their Esteem. Upon which Account they are altogether without the Blessing of that Friendship which is so Excellent in its own Nature, and for its own Sake, so desirable. For from themselves they have no Notion how much is the power and good of Friendship, because they were always Strangers to the Practice of it. That every Man's Affections are fix'd upon himself, proceeds not from the Gain or Interest he shall make of himself, but because Self-love and Preservation are Natural Principles ; and without a Friend be as a Man's Self, *True* Friendship is impracticable : For the very Nature of a Friend, requires that he be a Second Self. Now, if in every Species of Beings below Reason, and in every part of the *Brutal* World, there appears,

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first, a Natural Tendency to secure and preserve its self, and after that, a *Propensity* to consort and joyn with Animals of the same Nature; how much more Illustriously should these Principles of Power display themselves in the Rational World, that are under the Conduct of a *better Guide*, not only to love and be kind to themselves, but find out another Person of an agreeable Soul and Temper to theirs, and then both unite into one.

XXII. But we are Ill-natured, and Perverse to such a Height, (not to say impudent) that we expect such good Qualities in Friends, that we can our selves have none of; and demand more, and greater Things, than either our selves are either able or willing to perform. What is reasonable and fair, is this, that a Man should first be himself Good, and then seek out a Companion of the same Stamp and Quality: And then, indeed, the Friendship that is contracted between such Persons, will have that Firmness and Stability we have been discoursing about. Now, when Men unite by Complacency and Good-Nature, they will command and keep under those Passions that others are Subservient and Slaves to; they will manage, and be govern'd by Justice, and undertake any Thing that
may

Tully of Friendship. 69

may do each other good; and withal, their Demands will be reasonable and fair, and they will put nothing upon each other, that contradicts Honesty or Sincerity: So that there will not only be an Interchange of Love and Affection, but they will pay a *Deference* and *Reverence* to one another. For Friendship loses its Comeliness and Grace, when *Modesty* and *Decorum* are wanting. Therefore those Persons are very much in the Wrong, and grossly Mistaken, who are of Opinion, that Friendship gives Licence to the Practice of any Thing *Unseemly* or *Lewd*. Friendship was always intended by Nature, to go Hand in Hand with Virtue, but never to be made a Companion in Guilt; that whereas the Powers of Virtue in one Single Person, are not able to reach and attain Things that are in their Nature Sublime, they may be come at, by Union and Conjunction with another: And among what Persons such an Agreement and Sympathy has ever been, is maintain'd, or shall spring up; that Conversation and Commerce is the very first Happiness and Blessing of Humane Nature. This, I affirm, is that Conversation and Society in which are contained all those Things that Men think Valuable, and therefore Desirable, and worthy of Pursuit

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suit to render themselves Happy and Easy, because without them they cannot be so; such as Honesty, a Good Name, Peace, and Pleasure within. Now, if our Desires are after what is really Good, and a *true* Blessing; our Endeavours must be to Practise Virtue, and let that be the end of our Actions; for without it, we can neither attain the Happiness of Friendship, or the Blessing of any Thing else. And whenever we shake Hands with Virtue, and have no Business with it, we shall find our selves mistaken in our Accounts, in reckoning upon a Number of Friends, which any Misfortune that calls for their Assistance, will demonstrate we had not. For a very good Reason then, this is an Admonition that can never be too often reminded us, that we learn what Men are, before we admit them to be Friends, and not unite our Affections to them first, and afterwards see into their Value and Worth. Negligence and Dis-regard throws us into many Misfortunes and Inconveniences; but more particularly, betrays us into them in the Business of Friendship. and Correspondence with Mankind. We manage at a mad rate, and continue to play the Fool, which the Proverb has caution'd us against; when on a sudden, by the Appearance of some Misunderstanding,

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standing, we throw off that Friendship, which seem'd to be established by the mutual Endearments, and reciprocal Offices of Benevolence.

XXIII. Upon which Account then, to be Negligent and Regardless in an Affair of such Moment and Consequence, is a Fault wholly inexcusable; for there is no one Thing in Human Concerns, that the Voice of the World is so general to call a *Blessing*, as Friendship. Virtue it self hath not the Approbation of all Men; for there are those in the World, and not a few, who call it nothing but Vanity and Ostentation. Riches and mighty Affluence have no Relish, and go down but ill with those, who are content with the lesser Gifts of Fortune; and whom a moderate and easy Competency pleases and delights. Honour, the Idol and Desire of numerous Crowds, is despised and contemned by others, in whose Account and Sentiments, it passes for nothing above Trifles and Insignificance. As for other Things, it is the very same with them; what some love with Passion, pursue with Eagerness, and give the Name and Character of Excellent and Valuable to; Others, regard them no more than Things not worth looking

72 Tully of *Friendship*.

after, or spending any Thought or Time about. But as for the Dignity and Worth of *Friendship*, all Men joyn in a common Consent, as well those whose Business and Employments are the Concerns of the Publick, as those who are busy in the pursuit of Knowledge, and in the Improvement of their Intellectual Faculties; and also those who separated from the Hurry of the World, are concern'd only in what relates to themselves: And last of all, even Men of *Sense* and *Pleasure*, whose highest Aims are to gratifie their *Appetites*, confess and acknowledge an inseparable Necessity of Friendship to carry on the Pleasures of Life, and render themselves tolerably Happy. Friendship, by some means or other, gets into every State and Condition of Life; and indeed, there is no possibility of living without it: Should it happen now, that another *Timon* of *Athens* made his Appearance, plentifully furnish'd with *Ill-Nature* and *Resentment* against Conversation, and Mankind, he himself could not endure to be entirely alone; but would desire and seek out a Companion, to whom he might vent his *Spleen*, and disclose the malignity of his *Indignation*. But, for a further and infallible Conviction in this Matter, let us imagine, the *Gods* should separate

Tully of Friendship. 73

us from all Correspondence and Familiarity with the Sociable World, and confine us to *Retirement* and *Solitude*; yet, in this State, offer'd us all the Conveniences of Nature, and what is agreeable for the Pleasures of Life; but, I say, had entirely removed us from the power and possibility of seeing Man, the *Image* of our selves; where is the Man, so *indolent* and *insensible*, that could be easy under these Circumstances of *Being*, and wear away his Life agreeably; whose Restraint and Solitude from his own Species, wou'd not take away his Taste, spoil his Pleasure, and pall every Gratification *Affluence* can give? That is most infallibly true, which *Archytas* ^{the} of *Tarentine* used frequently to say to the World; and if I remember right, have been informed of it by old Men of this Age, who received it from those of another: That should any Mortal ascend to the higher Regions of the *Universe*, be informed of the Beauty of its Frame and Constitution, and be also made acquainted with the Nature and Elegancy of Heavenly Bodies, he would lose all the pleasure of the Entertainment, for want of a Companion to communicate what he had seen, which otherwise would have greatly raised and encreased his Satisfaction. So, upon the whole,

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whole, Nature disapproves of *Solitude* and *Retirement*, and endeavours after *Society* and *Converse*, which is the more pleasant and agreeable, the more Friendly it is.

XXIV. When Nature gives us so many fair Indications, and points out to us so very intelligibly, what she would have, aims at, and covets; we are void of *Sense*, and untowardly *Stupid*, not to regard those Things, or mind what she so plainly informs us of. To proceed then, Friendship has a large Field to Exercise its self in, and variety of Occurrences happen for its Operation; such as Jealousies, Surmises, and Misunderstandings, which is the Business and Duty of a Wise Man to prevent, and make the best of them he can; for those are stumbling Blocks that must be taken out of the way, lest they put a stop to Trust and Sincerity, those incomparable Qualifications in a genuine Friendship. It becomes necessary and expedient, often to take our Friends to Task, deal plainly with them, and charge home our Reproofs; and nothing of this Sort, ought to give Rise to Ill-Nature, or Passion, when they are meant Friendly, and intended well. I am at a loss to find out how that is true which my *Friend* and Familiar, *Terence*, has, in his *Andria*, asserted,

Truth

Tully of Friendship. 75

*Truth and Plain-Dealing do the World offend,
Whilst Fawning pleases, and acquires the Friend.*

Truth, I confess, gives Uneasiness when it raises Indignation and Hatred, the Poison and Destruction of Friendship; but then *Flattery and Fawning* are much more insupportable, which are afraid to show a Man his Faults, and permit his Friend to drive on till he is Ruin'd. It is granted, that Man is more culpable and faulty who turns a Deaf Ear to the Truth, and lets obsequiousness, and a Crowd of Parasites cast a Mist before his Eyes. Therefore, in Affairs of so nice a Nature, Reason and Care should be the Guide: First, That Admonitions and Advices be not joyn'd with bitter Invectives; and that Rebuke and Reproof be not delivered with an Air of Contempt and Disdain. In Obsequiousness to our Friends (because I wou'd use *Terence's* Expression) Complacency and Sweetness of Temper shou'd be joyned with it: But *Flattery*, that Pimp to Vice, should be entirely removed and abandon'd; which is neither agreeable to the Nature of a Friend, and unworthy the Character and Distinction of a Gentleman. There is a great deal of difference betwixt the Business of a Court-Parasite, and the Office

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Office of a Friend. When a Man has stop-
ped, and seal'd up his Ears against all
Reproof and the Truth; so that it is out
of his Power to hear what his *Friend* has
to say to him, though it carries Reason
and Truth along with it; such a Man's
Condition is deplorable indeed. This is
a remarkable and excellent *Saying* among
the many of *Cato's*, That a Man is more
beholden and indebted to his most *in-*
veterate and *spiteful Enemies*, than to his
Friends and *Familiars*, because these
have taken the freedom to speak plain-
ly to him while the other always a-
void it. Now this is very absurd and
out of the way, for Men that are Re-
proved by their Friend, so to mistake
themselves, as to be uneasy, and take it
ill, which they ought not, yet take no No-
tice of that which ought to Affect them.
That they are Guilty, is no manner of
Concern to them, but the Reproof of
their Friend is what they cannot endure;
which ought to be the contrary, they
should be asham'd and affected with their
Folly, and be pleased with the kind Admo-
nitions of their Friends.

XXV. But then, as a frank and ready
Disposition to advise our Friends, and a
submissive and calm Resignation to their
superior Judgment, are sure Character-
istics

Tully of Friendship. 77

sticks of a true and genuine *Friendship*; so on the other Hand, the greatest Bane, and the most effectual Means to dissolve its Union, is, *Flattery, Fawning, and Adulation*; for this Fault is branded with many Terms and Appellations, tho' it is peculiar to none but *light Coxcombs, or deceitful Villains*, who, without having any Regard to Truth and Honesty, make their own Fancy the Scope and End of their Discourse. Now, as *Dissimulation* on all Accounts, and even in Matters of the smallest Moment, deserves our Blame and Dislike, because it vitiates, and is inconsistent with Truth; so is it more especially repugnant to *Friendship*, because whenever we put on the Mask, and play the Hypocrite, we are forced to shake Hands with Sincerity and Honesty, which add so much Authority and Weight to it. For, if the Essence of *Friendship* consists in uniting two different Souls; how can we suppose such an Union, when even the single individual Soul of one of the Parties is so far from being consistent with its self, or of a Piece, that *Proteus* like, it is ever mutable and changing? For what can be more fickle, or like a Weather-cock, than a Fellow who not only conforms his Sentiments and Opinions, but his very Looks and Gesture to those of his Cully? If he denies it, It can never

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never be, says he ; doth he affirm it ? He replies, it is so. In short, like *Gnatho* in the Play, he makes a *Resolution* ever to fall into the Opinion of the Man he gets by ; and upon what a hopeful Foundation such a Friendship must be Grounded, is not very hard to determine. Besides, there are a sort of *Gnatho's* of a superior *Quality*, that are much more *unsupportable* ; who because Authority is added to their Vanity and Flattering, therefore think their Estate, Quality, or Reputation, will give them a *Privilege* for their Folly. But a genuine and true Friend, is as easily distinguished from a false and pretended One, as Paint and Varnish from the Natural Beauties of a lovely Face. An Assembly of *Cits*, tho' composed of none of the wisest Heads, shall easily distinguish between a *popular Self designing*, seditious *Knave*, and a stanch and true *Patriot*. How cunningly did *C. Paperius* the other Day tickle the Ears of the Audience, when he proposed a Law, to Impower the Tribunes of the People to stand Candidates for the same Office, successively from Time to Time. I opposed it, though out of Deference and Respect to *Scipio*, I must, at present, say nothing of my self, but give him the *Pre-eminence* : Ye Gods ! how graceful and pithy was the Oration he made upon that

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that Occasion ; which plainly show'd him the Chief, rather than a Member of the *Roman* State : But I need say no more in Praise of it ; for you your selves were present at the speaking of it, and I believe too, have it by you : The Effect of it was, as you know, the rejecting of the Bill, even by the Commons themselves. But to make mention of my self, you may remember how acceptable to the People the Law was, that *C. Licinius Crassus* made in the Consulship of *Quintus Maximus*, *Scipio's* Brother, and *Lucius Mancinus* ; which Law took the Power of Electing their own Fellows from the Hands of the College, and transferr'd it intirely unto the People : And indeed, he was the first that ever, in Publick *Comitia's*, sided with them : But thro' the Religion of the Gods, the Justness of the Cause, and my Assistance, that *Popular* and *Mercenary* Harangue fell short of its desired Effect. This happen'd in my *Prætorship*, five Years before I was *Consul* ; wherefore it was plain, that the Success of the Cause was owing to the Justness of it, rather than to the Interest and Authority of its Defender.

XXVI. Now, if *Sincerity* and *Truth* have so much Prevalence and Power, even when they appear upon the *Stage*, or at the *Bar*,
(Places

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(Places most adapted to Harangue and Fiction) ; how great and valuable are they in *Friendship*, which hath neither Worth or Significancy without them, they being the very Hinge on which it turns, and the Foundation it stands upon ? Wherefore, except this be, the Case, that one Friend hath a free Passage (as it were) into the other's Soul, there can be no Assurance or Security on either side ; nor till this be done, can it be discover'd whether the Passion is *Reciprocal*, or the Love, that flames in each others Breast, *pure and sincere*. Altho' *Flattery* or *Fawning* are dangerous, and of very ill Consequence, yet they can Prejudice, or bring Evil upon no Man, but him that is delighted with, and takes a Satisfaction in them. 'Tis Common and Natural, for the Man, that is fond of himself, proud of his own Abilities, and in love with his own Person, to have his Ears open and attentive to whatever any nauseous Flatterer shall ring in them. *Virtue* is enamoured, and highly delighted with her self ; for she is very well acquainted with her own Worth and Dignity, and perfectly understands how amiable she is. *Virtue*, in reality and truth, is not my present Business ; but that which consists in *Opinion* and *Outside*, and would pass for what is genuine.

For

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For, it is the general Aim and Intention of Mankind, rather to be thought *Virtuous*, and seem worthy of that Character, than Endeavour in earnest *to be so*. Flattery and fine Words give infinite Pleasure to these; and when the World talks of them according to their Wish, they imagine every Thing true that is said of them, and take it to be a just Encomium due to their Qualities and Merit. Therefore there is nothing of Friendship here; where the one is unwilling to hear Things as they really are, and the other hath engaged himself to smother the Truth. Flattery would be odious even upon the Stage it self did it not support the Character of a *bragging Gnatho*. Very good, says the *Ranter*, Had the *Lady* any Sence of the Favours? She had, would have fatisfied the *Bully*; but he adds, *Sir, she was obliged to the highest degree, and was inexpressively grateful for the present*. This is very agreeable to the Nature of *Parasites* and *Flatterers*, who do more than conform themselves to the Expectation of their *Cullies*, by ever magnifying Things to them, and representing them bigger than they really are: Wherefore, tho' Men, who court and caress Adulation and Praise, without Thought or Reflection, take down full Draughts of them; yet it may not be amiss to give a

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Caution to the Wise and Discerning part of the World, to be always upon their Guard, and examine Things thoroughly, least they be carried into a liking of the same Vanity. He must be blind and stupid indeed, that cannot be aware of Flattery, when it is gross and apparent ; but Care and Regard become necessary against sly and insinuating Fawners, that Way-lay us, and act under Covert. There is a great deal of Difficulty in finding out the Impostor, who sometimes conceals his *Flattery* under a shew of Opposition, lets it get the Upper-hand of the Argument ; at last suffers himself to be *Nonplus'd*, and gives up the Cause, that the *Cully* may fancy himself the better Man of the Two : But who can bear to be chous'd ? Wherefore we ought to guard our selves against it ; as in the Play, an Old Man crys out, *Why should you pick me out from the rest of the Old Fools, to make a Cully of ?* For this, even in Plays, is the Part that is Acted by old credulous silly Dotards.

XXVII. But I am surprized to find, how insensibly I am gone off from talking of the Nature of that Friendship which is between Persons of perfect Wisdom, (I mean Persons so finish'd in that Excellency, as the Weakness and Infirmary of Hu-

Tully of Friendship. 83

Humane Nature will admit) to the Correspondencies and Familiarities of *Impertinents* and *Coxcombs*. Wherefore let us return to our first Purpose and Design, and withal, draw to a Conclusion. It is Virtue, (my Friends) I say, it is Virtue that first Forms and Establishes Friendship, and afterwards continues and preserves the Being of it ; for in that there is every Thing convenient and conducive ; in that is placed its very Foundation and Support. Now, whenever Virtue displays herself in a beautiful Appearance, and both finds and meets her self in another Person : She makes her Advances to it, and Unites firmly with it : From which Union and Conjunction proceeds, what we call by the Names of Love and Friendship ; for they derive their Original from the same Word, that is, from *Amare, to love* : Now, *Amare*, in its natural and proper Signification, imports, *the standing affected for, or loving a Person, without any Thought of serving our selves, or making any Advantage thereby* : And indeed, wherever a Friendship of this Nature is cultivated, all those Advantages are the Consequences and Attendants of it, though they be not enquired after. Upon this Foundation was my Love and Esteem fix'd in my younger Days, for

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those Persons of a more Venerable and Advanced Age : Namely, *Lucius Paulus*, *Marcus Cato*, *Caius Gallius*, *Publius Nasica*, and *Tiberius Gracchus*, that was Father-in-Law to my very good Friend *Scipio*. But a Friendship of this Quality more powerfully, and more exquisitely appears between Correspondents of the same Level and Equality, as remarkably did between *Scipio* and my self ; not excluding *Lucius Furius*, *Publius Rupilius*, and *Spurius Mummius*. And now, having changed my Years, and grown pretty forward in Life, I am delighted and gratified in the Complacency and Friendship, that is carried on and maintained between my self and my Juniors ; and especially between you, Gentlemen, and *Quintus Tubero* : And I can't help mentioning, how much I am pleased and taken in the Conversation and Familiarity of *Publius Rutilius*, and *Aulus Virgilius*, Familiars that are young indeed. But, upon this Score, because such is the Condition and State of Human Nature, that one Age and Generation constantly succeeds and treads upon the Heels of another ; a Man more heartily wishes and Desires to go along and keep pace with those he sets out with unto the end of the Stage. But give me leave to say, since there is so much of Uncertainty and

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and Weakness in Nature, we should seek out those Persons, and that Acquaintance, we can firmly joyn our Affections to, and that will also entertain a mutual Love for us. For, if Friendship, Tenderness, and Benevolence be wanting, we lose all true Pleasure of Being. *Scipio*, it is very well known, retired from the World, and made a sudden *Exit*; yet he continues to live, and shall never die: For I lov'd and admir'd the Virtues and good Qualities of him, which will ever live, and have a Place in my Soul: Moreover, it is not I alone that was well acquainted with his Virtue, who shall be happy thereby: No, it will continue to Posterity, shine bright in *after Ages*, and look well in *distant Futurity*: And to make this good, there will not be found the Man that shall undertake any thing uncommon or great, but *Scipio*, shall be all with him; the Remembrance of that *Great Man* will push him forward, and his Example stand a Rule for his Imitation. As for my part, I make an ingenuous Confession, that whatever Blessings I enjoy either from Nature, or in my Condition of Life, are not to be compared with the Blessing and Happiness I had in *Scipio's Friendship*. From the Benefit of this, we agreed in every Business of Life, whether Political or Private; and from the

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the Benefit of this, we spent our leisure Hours, in the sweet Enjoyment of each other. I never (to my knowledge) offended, or gave him, *distaste* in any thing; neither did I ever hear from him, what I wish'd had not escap'd him; one common Place of Abode, one Table, and the same Entertainment, provided for us both; whether at the *Head* of the *Army*, or *Travelling*, or retired to our Country-Houses, we were Inseparable. I silently pass by the many Hours we have spent together in our Studies, in conversing with Works of Philosophers, and Men of Learning, whenever we got rid of the World, and were free from *Hurry* and *Importunity*. And were it granted, that the Remembrance of these Things might be extinguish'd when *Scipio* died; yet Love, and Desire for so valuable a Person, would always have been lodg'd in my Breast, and the Man I should never have forgot. However, nothing that ever past betwixt us is lost, for constancy of Reflection sinks them deeper, and improves them to a better Advantage. And had I none of these Things to reflect upon, the thoughts of my Age would relieve me; from which I have the Assurance, that I shall not long be absent from my Friend, and dwell only in remembrance of

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of him : All Afflictions, though severe and sharp, yet from the shortness of their continuance, lose their Sting, and so become tolerable. And this is all that I had to deliver upon the Subject of Friendship : and shall dismiss you with this Admonition, That since Friendship can have no Being without *Virtue*, you would always Esteem, and give the *Precedency* to *Virtue*, as the most valuable Thing in Nature ; and then look upon Friendship in the next Place, as the choicest and greatest Blessing of Life.

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ERRATA.

TITLE-Page, *Quotat.* L. 6. read *quam*
habere, for *Omni*, read *Omnia*, P. 4. l. 25.
for *geras*, read *years*, P. 26. l. 25. after *Mælius*,
read *also to*, P. 34. l. 7. for *Lænaus*, read *Læ-*
natus, P. 65. l. 8. for *which in case*, read *in*
which case, P. 68. l. 5. for *Principles of Power*,
read *Principles of Nature*, P. 69. l. 7. for *Reve-*
rence, read *Respect*, P. 74. l. 20. for *Trust*, read
Truth, P. 76. l. 25. for *with*, read *for*.



